Development of
Underutilized Species
An Analysis of
Best Practices based on Case Studies for Devil’s Claw, Quinoa and Physic Nut
For
The Global Facilitation Unit for
Underutilized Species
Via dei Tre Denari 472/A
00057
Maccarese
Rome
Italy
By
Tom
Hazekamp
Via L. Bonincontri
79
00147
Rome
Italy
Oct
2004
Table of
Contents
Devil’s claw (Harpagophytum procumbens DC & H. zeyheri
Decne.) 3
Introduction to species and its
use. 3
Supplying international
markets. 5
Quinoa (Chenopodium
quinoa Willd.) 7
Introduction to species and its
use. 7
Physic Nut (Jatropha
curcas L.) 11
Introduction to species and its
use. 11
Link to financial
incentives. 17
Improve position of primary
producers. 18
Product diversification and
cottage industries. 18
In
this paper case studies for 3 crops are analyzed to formulate ‘best practices’
in developing the potential of promising species. The cases concern studies
commissioned by the Global Facilitation Unit (GFU) on Harpagophytum procumbens (Devil’s claw)[1],
Chenopodium quinoa (Quinoa)[2]
and Jatropha curcas (Physic nut)[3],
[4]. The
development of promising species is a very challenging activity. Often entire
marketing and production systems have to be designed or re-aligned to serve the
market place. There is fierce competition from established products and
engrained consumer preferences to overcome. Nevertheless, if the effort pays off
the rewards can be significant in terms of economic, social and environmental
benefits.
The
3 case studies concern very different crops with very different production
characteristics and market opportunities. The studies on Jatropha include cases from Central
America, Africa and S.E. Asia. It illustrates that different locations require
different scenarios. Even for the same species. Implementation requires a
thorough analysis of local opportunities and threats. The current analysis will
describe the reasons behind the promotion of these species, the approaches used,
the particular areas of the intervention and the stakeholders
involved.
Devil’s
claw is the common name for 2 species, Harpagophytum procumbens and H.
zeyheri, that are native to the Kalahari desert in Southern Africa.
H.
procumbens is recognized for its medicinal properties (arthritic and
musculoskeletal pain relief) and predominantly found in Namibia, Botswana and
South Africa. H. zeyheri is also found in Angola, Zambia
and Mozambique. It is though to have similar but much less potent medicinal
properties than H. procumbens. In addition to a small,
established domestic market for Devil’s claw there is a much larger
international demand. International demand is increasing. From 28 metric tons in
1973, the global market is currently estimated to be between 600 and 700 metric
tons of raw material each year[5],
[6].
The increased international demand originates from the European Union and the US
markets. In Germany alone the market value increased from €8 million in 1999 to
€31 million in 2002[7].
The
market prospects for Devil’s Claw are good. There is an increasing demand from
herbal medicine markets internationally. The potential of the species to develop
and generate income is substantial. The area where Harpagophytum can be grown, and commercial
utilization is viable, is restricted to parts of Southern Africa. Competition
from elsewhere is therefore not an immediate threat although attempts are made
to grow the species commercially in Morocco. In principle strict control over
the supply side of the production could dictate the market and optimize
revenues.
There
are several areas where the use of Harpagophytum could be enhanced. These
include the implementation of sustainable use, optimized income generation for
collectors and a more predictable and high quality production to suit the
international markets.
The
roots that contain the active ingredient, harpagoside, are traditionally
harvested from the wild. Rough
estimates indicate that there
are something 10,000 people involved in the harvesting of Devil's Claw in
Namibia and another 4,000 in Botswana and South Africa[8].
Many of the collectors are impoverished people. They often depend entirely on
the harvesting of Devil’s claw for their livelyhoods. The increased
international demand has put the
natural plant populations of Devil’s Claw under stress. Concern about the
sustainability of the harvesting practices has been raised. This culminated in
a, hitherto unsuccessful, proposal to list Devil’s Claw on Annex II of CITES.
Several initiatives are aiming to make the use more
sustainable:
§
Legal
instruments
Most
of the governments involved have legislation in place that requires collectors
and traders to register. In principle this would provide a control over the
amount of plant material that is collected and traded.
§
Train
collectors
The
collecting of roots is a labor intensive activity. The root system has to be dug
out from the soil before the secondary roots can be cut loose from the taproot.
Improper harvesting techniques can damage the plant with a total loss as result.
Devil’s Claw is a relatively slow growing plant that takes an average 4 years
before it can be harvested again. Premature harvesting leads to sub-optimal
yields. Programmes have been set up to train collectors in seeking out mature
specimens for harvesting and proper harvesting techniques. A “quadrant”
cultivation technique (a sector is only harvested once every 4 years) has been
developed that allows the plants to recuperate.
Although
the market value of Hapargophytum products is substantial, the
marketing channel is long and includes many intermediaries. The collectors of
Devil’s Claw roots fetch
very low prices. These vary between N$1-8 per kg of
dried roots. Collectors are often in a weak position to negotiate a good price
with a trader. They lack sufficient market intelligence that allows them to
assess whether the price offered is fair. Besides, the sale is often forced at
unfavorable conditions to settle existing financial debts.
Several
projects involving NGO’s are working together with collectors to organize the
collecting and sales. Collectors organized in groups generally obtain better
yields and are able to sell their produce at higher prices. In the case of the
Sustainable Harvesting of Devil’s Claw (SHDC) project, collectors are paid a
guaranteed price. Some groups have been able to bypass a large part of the
intermediaries. This resulted in substantially better markups for the sold
produce. These projects work on the hypothesis that if better yields are
obtained, local communities will be much more inclined to take care of the basic
resource and implement sustainable harvesting methods.
International
markets demand high quality source materials and a reliable supply. The
collected material of Harpagophytum from the wild is very
variable in terms of quality and yield. The cultivation of Harpagophytum on farms has so far been
regarded as not commercially viable. The slow growth of the plant is mentioned
as one of the main reasons. However recently trails with cultivated Harpagophytum yield promising
results. Growing conditions can be
better controlled on the farm and yields, quality and quantity, are high
compared to material harvested from the wild. A German herbal medicine company
is in the process of up-scaling their production. Some additional trials are
underway to test alternative cultivation methods, which, if successful, would
put commercial farming on a better footing. In principle commercial farming
would be an instrument to serve the growing international markets with high
quality source material and a dependable supply. It would also relieve some of
the pressure on the natural populations and thus help to implement a sustainable
use of the species.
The table below lists a number of
intervention areas and indicates which ones are being applied in the case of
Devil’s Claw.
|
Intervention
Area |
Applied |
Description |
|
Access, conservation and
improvement |
ü |
§
Development of sustainable harvesting practices
for natural stands §
Development of new cultivation techniques
(commercial cult.) |
|
Post-harvest handling and
processing |
ü |
§
Processing harvested material (milling) by
harvesters (not popular with exporters because of lack of quality
control) |
|
Policy and
legislation |
ü |
§
Permit system for collecting and
trade |
|
Awareness creation and
lobbying |
|
|
|
Marketing |
ü |
§
Promote producer
associations §
Assure more equitable sharing of
benefits §
Certification of organic
produce |
|
Capacity
building |
ü |
§
Train harvesters in sustainable
techniques |
|
Information generation and
management |
|
§
Documentation and dissemination of local
knowledge on harvesting |
|
Inter-sectoral
interventions |
ü |
§
Involve private industry in the development of
cultivation methods §
Government and NGO’s to promote sustainable
use |
There
is a very broad mix of stakeholders actively involved in the commercialization
of Devil’s Claw. Local harvesters are working with NGO’s to implement
sustainable harvesting practices, obtain fair prices and optimize income.
Commercial farmers and herbal medicine companies are involved in developing
cultivated farming of Devil’s Claw. At the national level, the respective
governments have put legislation in place to regulate the trade in Devil’s Claw.
The approach developed is fairly well integrated at the various levels and
includes the key stakeholders. National policies and local activities all work
towards a sustainable use of Devil’s Claw based on financial incentives for the
harvesters.
Quinoa
has been cultivated in the Andean region since 3,000 BC (Tapia 1982). It is less
well known that Chenopodium was a common component of
farming systems in the hilly and mountainous regions of Asia, particularly the
Himalayas (Partap 1998). Its adaptation to cold, dry climates and excellent
nutritional qualities make Quinoa a crop of considerable value to highland
areas. Cultivation in Asia is diminishing as subsistence farmers have switched
to better yielding mono-cultures. In South America the production is for the
most part used for home consumption (77% in Bolivia and 60% in Peru). Production
in Bolivia varied between 16- 28,000 MT for the period 1990-2001 (MAGDER).
Bolivia is the major producer worldwide (46%), closely followed by Peru (42%).
Besides
a significant consumption by subsistence farmers themselves, there exists a
limited domestic market. Many potential consumers are aware of Quinoa’s high
nutritional value, but increasingly rule it out of their diet in favor of
imported alternatives such as rice or wheat based food stuffs. These are often
cheaper, easier to prepare and have a more urbane image. These factors largely
suppress a spontaneous surge in domestic demand. There is an emerging
international health-food market, in which organic Quinoa has earned itself a
place. However international market demands are difficult to meet considering
that by far the largest proportion of Quinoa is grown as a subsistence crop.
This means that supplies are very unpredictable and the produce is not
homogeneous. The crops grown have much inherent variation to cope with ardent
and variable atmospheric conditions. Enhancement of use should come from better
serving national and international markets. Production, especially for
international markets is currently too intensive and threatens to exhaust the
soil. Sustainability of this type of cultivation is becoming an issue affecting
yields.
The
production of Quinoa is typified by a dispersed production of small farmers in
often remote areas. It is estimated that 75,000 producers are involved.
Intermediaries play an important role in stockpiling the produce and making it
available to industrial processors. In Bolivia there are only few industrial
processors. They mainly produce for the domestic market. In general, the product
quality does not meet international market standards.
In
Bolivia there are 2 different agricultural production systems. In the north most
Quinoa is produced on small farms by subsistence farmers, while in the south
farms produce more for the national and international markets. In general they
cultivate more uniform varieties and cultivation is more intensive and
mechanized. There is no permanent seed improvement programme that would help to
increase yields in a consistent manner. Soil degradation as a result of improper
mechanized cultivation and a lack of a pest management strategy result in
declining yields (especially in South Bolivia). Post harvesting losses (24%)
further compound yield problems. Although education and training programmes have
been implemented to introduce better suited cultivation methods, they failed to
result in the wide spread implementation of more suitable agricultural practices
as results fell short of the farmer’s expectations.
In
Bolivia it is felt that demand, both nationally and internationally, could be
stimulated with more active Government involvement. Diplomatic missions could
promote this fairly unique crop abroad. At the national level Governments could
do more to promote the consumption. That this could be very effective is
demonstrated in Peru where some Governmental Food Aid programmes procure quinoa.
This is thought to have been the main reason that cultivation has increased from
18,000 to 30,000 metric tons in just 4 years. Similar preferential buyer
programmes could be implemented more widely to support domestic production and
reduce often subsidized food stuff imports from
abroad.
Many
farmers do not have sufficient access to financial services that will allow them
to invest in their businesses. This makes it difficult for them to respond to
new market demands, e.g. export market. Communal farmer cooperations often have
no firm legal status, limiting their access to services, and often have a
decision making process that is not suitable to respond to commercial
opportunities.
On
many of the areas that pose limitations, as listed above, activities have been
going on. The interactions in the market chain are studied. Stakeholders, such
as producers and industrial processors, are brought together to agree on
production.
Agronomical
research is focusing on building up germplasm collections, selecting higher
yielding varieties, new cultivation techniques that will lead to less soil
degradation. An integrated pest management system is also under development.
Most
of these activities are not new. They were started in the 1960’s, when the first
attempt was made to integrate Government Quinoa research activities, but have
recently been revitalized as government services in Bolivia have been
reorganized.
At
the end of the ‘90’s the Bolivian Government developed a new strategy for
agricultural development in which NGO’s have a much more important role to play
at the sub-national level. This has undoubtedly led to a more participation
oriented development in which farmers are given a more active role. The NGO’s in
general help producers to get organized and optimize their income generation
opportunities. They aim to provide fairer prices for farmers. Several mechanisms
are applied. Some organizations provide price guarantees above average trading
prices. This way additional income is generated and income becomes more
predictable. By accumulating the small harvests of individual farmers into
larger lots, they are able to trade these directly with large industrial
processors and exporters. This results in better prices for the farmers since
intermediaries are cut out of the loop. By pooling farmer’s resources NGO’s can
help primary producers to make joint investments that would not be attainable by
individuals.
The table below lists a number of
intervention areas and indicates which ones are being applied in the case of
Quinoa.
|
Intervention
Area |
Applied |
Description |
|
Access, conservation and
improvement |
ü |
§
Crop and cultivation improvement
programmes §
Building up germplasm
collections |
|
Post-harvest handling and
processing |
ü |
§
Seed cleaning to improve product
quality |
|
Policy and
legislation |
ü |
§
Government preferential buying schemes
(Peru) §
Legislation to protect traditional knowledge
(Bolivia) |
|
Awareness creation and
lobbying |
ü |
§
Promote nutritional qualities of Quinoa (not
enough) |
|
Marketing |
ü |
§
Product
diversification §
Product certification
(organic) §
Promote producer
associations §
Promote linkages between actors within
production chain |
|
Capacity
building |
ü |
§
Training and education programmes for farmers
(but ineffective) §
Participative
research |
|
Information generation and
management |
|
|
|
Inter-sectoral
interventions |
ü |
§
Activities to improve alignment of producers
and processors §
Linkage to State Food Aid
Agency |
The
production chain seems very loosely organized. The fact that much of the
production takes place on small farms in very remote areas must have contributed
to this. The NGO’s are playing an important role by linking primary producers
with industrial processors. They actively establish the linkages and coordinate
actions and try to achieve a better adjustment of the various actors in the
production chain. They facilitate the farmer’s access to the national and
international markets, provide technical assistance, access to processing
facilities and implement quality control principles. The role of government is
vital. It is one of the few institutions that has enough weight to influence the
direction of developments. In Bolivia the Government has diminished its direct
involvement in agricultural development. Responsibilities for there have been
decentralized to sub-national levels. As a result government agencies play a
minor role. In Peru Government progammes have been used much more actively. The
state run food assistance programme has started to substitute imported cereals
with Quinoa. This has had a definite effect on demand. As such there seems still
quite some scope to improve linkages between producers, research, the industry,
the government and consumers.
Physic
nut is a drought resistant shrub native to the Caribbean, but has been
introduced in various parts of the tropics. Used as life fence and in
reforestation projects. The species is grown for medicinal purposes and for its
oil. Waste products (seed press cake) are good green fertilizers, while
cultivation of the plant improves the quality of the
soil.
Physic
nut has multiple uses across the tropical and subtropical areas around the
globe. These range from use by local farmers as life fences to large bio-energy
and re-forestation projects driven by national development programmes. The so
called “Jatropha-system” describes how the species can be used in erosion
control, income generation from derivatives and provide a source of renewable
energy. This potential makes the species, especially in marginal conditions and
on waste land, a very interesting crop. This large potential has a danger that
its capabilities can easily be overestimated. In Belize, a reforestation project
run by an NGO made the harvesting of Jatropha fruits for oil production part of
its strategy for sustainable use. Only to find out later that labor costs would
be far too high to make this in any way feasible. In 1991 a government project
in Nicaragua attempted a large scale monoculture of Jatropha. The project was considered an
answer fill the void that resulted from the collapse of the cotton cultivation
due to low world market prices. The project objectives were to address national
energy concerns (substitute fossil for bio-diesel), create rural employment,
reclaim degraded land and produce useful spin-off raw materials such as fodder
concentrates etc. Although the
government provided substantial support the project failed. The management of
the project was inadequate and expectations in terms of expected yields far
exceeding realistic values. The introduction of Jatropha in monoculture was also a very
risky strategy since farmers were made financially completely dependant on the
performance of this crop.
Disappointment with yields, unresolved land owner issues, short-term
donor support and various other matters eroded support from the farmers involved
and the project collapsed in 1998.
In
India there is quite some experience with Jatropha. Earlier efforts have met with
limited success. Experience indicated that production under marginal conditions
seemed to survive a lot better than on plantations. Nevertheless there is a lot
of experience and political backing for reintroduction is very strong. The
discussion prior to the selection of Jatropha as a spearhead species for
development has been long and extensive with broad participation. Besides strong political and government
support, involvement of other actors is extensive. NGO’s, Universities, oil
processors and large institutional fuel consumers are all buying in. Farmers will be provided with free or
near free plant material and will benefit from investment incentives and
buy-back agreements that provide a secure market and limits their risks. Private
projects such as the Daimler Chrysler Project demonstrate the concept and
provide much publicity in favor of Jatropha.
The
approach to use Jatropha, and to a smaller extent Pongomia, in a National Programme that
jointly addresses energy concerns, poverty alleviation and environmental issues
(erosion/deforestation) is very ambitious. It involves the planned production of
13 million tones of bio-diesel by 2013 (>>1000 times present global Jatropha production). It will involve a
massive introduction of Jatropha on currently un-used land. Some of the production estimates
underlying the plan seem overly optimistic and there are still quite some
factors requiring more research. Phase I of the project will be used to yield
more solid data that will allow a realistic cost evaluation.
In
Africa the cultivation of Jatropha curcas goes back quite some time. During
the 1940’s Benin and Madagascar were cultivating Jatropha and exported the fruits/oil to
France for soap production. In many countries throughout Africa Jatropha can be found in hedges to protect
crops from animal grazing. Sometimes no additional use of the plant is made,
while elsewhere the seeds are collected and used to produce oil and press
residues, which is used as a natural fertilizer. The oil is successfully used in
small cottage industries to produce soap. This provides additional income. Use
as substitute fuel for internal combustion engines, cooking or lighting have
proved economically viable only in very remote areas where distribution of
fossil fuel is restricted and consequent costs are higher. Jatropha has been successful in combating
soil erosion and in the rehabilitation of soil. In some cases (Tanzania) the oil
obtained from Jatropha is used for cooking fuel and
resulted in less fuel wood being harvested from other species. Some projects,
often linked to private enterprise, are underway in Egypt, South Africa and
Ghana to establish large Jatropha plantations. These plantations
are receiving
initial financing from the Trade of Emission Certificates as the plantations
function as ‘carbon sinks’. However it is assumed that their economic viability
depend on a rise in cost of conventional fuel prices. This would make bio-diesel
more competitive with fossil fuel.
The
versatility of Jatropha is mirrored in the variety of
manners it is used. This ranges from small to large scale developments. Its
ability to be used on marginal or waste land, and actually improve these soils,
is a very strong point in its favour. It allows it to avoid direct competition
with established productive crops.
The
examples from Africa show that small scale deployment can be very successful
especially in providing income opportunities for smallholder farmers. The
examples of large scale deployment in several countries in Africa and India
illustrate that such an approach requires substantial financial support from
either private or public sources. These projects very much anticipate global
trends, such as the rise of fossil fuel prices, stricter pollution normatives
etc. In this sense they are more strategic in nature and short-term
profitability is subordinate to longer-term viability. Despite its potential,
there are also examples of failed implementation. In the case of Nicaragua the
attempt to use Jatropha on relatively high quality
agricultural land was risky as competition with established production crops
would be fierce. As yield predictions were over optimistic, support from farmers
evaporated fast and the project as a whole was marooned before it could prove
its real potential. Likewise the project in Belize could not deliver what it set
out to do.
The table below lists a number of
intervention areas and indicates which ones are being applied in the case of
Jatropha.
|
Intervention
Area |
Applied |
Description |
|
Access, conservation and
improvement |
ü |
§
Crop improvement programme
(India) §
Plant material distribution programme
(India)
|
|
Post-harvest handling and
processing |
ü |
§
Research into efficient processing techniques
(India) §
Industrial trial facilities
(India) §
Cottage industries
(Africa) |
|
Policy and
legislation |
ü |
§
Part of National development agenda
(India) §
Links to Int. Treaties on Pollution and
Climatic Change (Crop acts as ‘carbon sink’) (Africa,
India) |
|
Awareness creation and
lobbying |
ü |
§
Promotion through National Programme
(India) §
Promotion by NGO’s as subsistence crop
(Africa) |
|
Marketing |
ü |
§
Development cottage industries
(Africa) §
Heavy government involvement provides high
level of security for investors (India) §
Investment incentives and buy-back agreements
(India) |
|
Capacity
building |
ü |
§
Training participants
(India) |
|
Information generation and
management |
ü |
§
Store relevant information and make these
available to participants (India) |
|
Inter-sectoral
interventions |
ü |
§
Involvement from Universities, NGO’s,
processors and consumers etc.
(India) |
The
production chain for Jatropha includes a wide variety of
stakeholders ranging from farmers, Universities, NGO’s, private enterprise,
industrial processors, governments to end-users.
Depending
on approach (small vs. large scale) the relative weight of stakeholders changes.
The African model is very much driven without heavy Government involvement. The
Indian model is exactly the opposite. However in both cases the communication
between the various stakeholders is vital to have a clear insight in what can be
expected and what the risks are.
This
analysis on best practices is based on 3 quite different species:
§
Devils Claw,
a species native to Southern Africa which is used for medicinal
purposes
§
Quinoa a
pseudo-cereal food plant native to the Andes in South
America
§
Physic nut a
species native to the Caribbean but grown widely in the tropics and subtropics.
It is used for medicinal purposes and more importantly its ability to produce
oil, which could serve as an alternative, renewable source of energy
fuel.
There
are many reasons to develop the potential of promising species. These include
food security, sustainable agriculture, health, consumer appetite for novelties
etc. The bottom line is that key stakeholders such as farmers and private
industry will only be committed to such developments if they have a reasonable
chance to generate profits. Especially in the context of improving the
livelihood of subsistence farmers, development of promising species needs to be
geared towards achieving a secure and/or positive income effect that matures in
the short run and is at the same time viable at the long term. Most subsistence
farmers will simply lack means to tie their resources up in long-term
investments. They definitely lack the resources to invest in high-risk
developments that, upon failure, immediately threaten their livelihoods.
If
we accept the idea that financial gain is the motor driving the process of
promising species development we should consider different ways to generate more
income.
Let’s
first consider the case of Devil’s claw.
It concerns a medicinal species with an established domestic market and
an emerging high-value international market. The production area is limited to
parts of southern Africa and number of people involved in the harvesting is
relatively small (estimated 14,000). The increased demand has put the natural
plant population under stress and without regulation the harvesting would have
become unsustainable. The approach taken shows a good integration at the various
levels. National governments have moved to provide a legal framework to regulate
the harvesting and trade through a permit system. At the local level NGO’s have
taken the initiative to organize collectors. This has had a direct positive
income effect for the collectors. NGO’s collect the produce from individual
harvesters. Since the collective yield represents a much larger volume, they can
reduce dependency on intermediaries that would normally collect, stock and
transport the material, and deal directly with industrial processors. Compared
to individual smallholder farmers, an organization such as an NGO is in a much
better position to acquire proper market information. This is critical to find
appropriate markets and maximize income. As a result of the NGO’s mediation, the
harvesters are able to increase their individual income. The direct income
effect has made it possible for the NGO’s to sensitize the harvesters to the
value of the natural Harpagophytum populations and address
additional concerns. The training of harvesters in more sustainable harvesting
methods has put the use of Harpagophytum on a much more sustainable
footing. Besides the positive income effect there is another potential spin-off
from shortening of the production chain. The number of stakeholders is reduced
which would, in principle, make it easier to align supply and demand. This
creates possibilities to exploit market opportunities to their fullest and
optimize income for all stakeholders involved. In addition to the harvesting of
natural products, trials are conducted to bring Harpagophytum under cultivation. Much of
the research in this direction is privately funded as the potential market value
returns are high. If successful, the cultivated yield would complement naturally
harvested material and be able to respond to an increasing international demand.
The fact that the species grows in a well defined area, at least so far, opens a
further opportunity for the producers involved have at least some control over
the market price by controlling the supply side. This however will require close
collaboration between the governments involved.
In
the case of Quinoa we see that NGO’s have played a
similar important role. By organizing the, in large part, isolated smallholder
farmers and mediate in the selling of their joint produce, a positive income
effect can be achieved. The extra income, if retained locally, leads to
investments in other local structures and services, e.g. seed cleaning
machinery, which improves the product quality and ultimately selling price. Over
time such additive local investments will have a significant impact on rural
development. The case of Quinoa shows another important marketing
tool: product diversification. In Bolivia there is an established rural market
and a more urban and international health-food market. For the urban and
international market a special variety is grown "Royal
Quinoa” which is visually more attractive (big, white seeds). In addition
derived products like Quinoa flour, flakes, toasted and expanded grains are
marketed. The more urbane and international markets are growing slightly, but
can not always be served well. These markets demand a predictable and high
quality supply, which is often difficult to realise with a crop such as Quinoa
which is grown under very marginal conditions. There are cases where exporters
have abandoned the highly affluent North-American and European markets and now
focus on markets in the more immediate region.
Compared
to Harpagophytum, the market for Quinoa is much larger in volume (not in
value) and more people are involved in the production (75,000 vs 14,000). This
obviously would justify a more active government involvement. How effective this
can be is shown in Peru. Government food aid programmes have switched from using
imported cereals such as wheat to using Quinoa. The increase in Quinoa production in Peru has been notable
as the government programmes provide a very reliable source of income for
farmers. The move makes sense from an economic perspective. The funds remain
inside the country and provide employment and purchasing power for the local
population. The role of governments is very important since they are able to
create supportive legal frameworks, and are often the only key stakeholder that
can make long-term and sustained investments. Especially in the case of newly
introduced crops this is a requisite during the initial adaptation and
development phases.
This
brings us directly to the third case study of Jatropha in India. The Indian government
has launched a very ambitious, multi-species bio-energy programme of which the
massive introduction of Jatropha is an important part. The species
will be introduced on marginal lands. All key players are thoroughly involved in
the programme from producers, research, processors to end consumers. The full
endorsement of the Government means that the programme has ensured a high degree
of sustainability and security which is very important to win the commitment
from private investors big and small. These range from subsistence farmers,
industrial (oil-mills) investors to industrial consumers. The financial
incentives for subsistence farmers are created because the Government Programme
will mean a guaranteed demand and thus income stability. Industrial investors
also benefit from such a situation as it takes a lot of the risk out of the
equation. The plan is very daring and, if successful, will achieve a multitude
of very strategic goals. The same
species is successfully used in Africa in a completely different scenario. There
low-maintenance Jatropha hedges earn their keep as life
fences protecting valuable cash crops from damage by animals. The oil that can
be derived from Jatropha seeds has become the basis for a
“cottage industry” producing soap. It provides extra income and other useful
waste such as green-fertilizer (seed press cake).
The
2 cases of failed introduction of Jatropha in Belize and Nicaragua started
out right, by linking sustainable cultivation to positive income effects.
However in Belize important costs factors were overlooked (cost of labor) which
totally cancelled any hope on a sustainable programme. The failure of the
Nicaraguan initiative can be attributed to several fatal miscalculations. Heavy
dependency on foreign aid to sustain the programme’s core activities, projected
harvests that were not realized in time, unresolved land owner issues that
eroded confidence of key stakeholders etc.
The
premise of this analysis on best practices has been that profitability
expectations drive the actions of private stakeholders. Monetary and livelihood
issues are very much interdependent. Production chains in the agricultural
sector, more often than not, include private enterprises at vital sections of
the chain. This starts with the individual farmer who produces the primary
source materials!
Programmes
to introduce or develop promising species need to take this into account from
the very start. Project objectives need to be linked to financial incentives for
private stakeholders or one cannot expect full stakeholder commitment. Financial
incentives come in many flavors. Most often they are aimed at achieving a direct
positive income effect (more effective income) or an increase in income
predictability (income security).
How these financial incentives are created depends very much on the local
situation. The case studies highlight a number of approaches on how to achieve
income effects e.g. by making a better use of existing market mechanisms.
The
organization of primary producers in cooperative structures is one way to
strengthen the position of this group in the market. As a group they will have
more possibilities to obtain relevant market information and a better
negotiating position to sell their produce. Although there might be a natural
tendency to look at affluent international markets to sell more produce,
domestic markets might actually offer better opportunities. These markets are
usually better accessible for local producers, less demanding and more
dependable.
Other
approaches such as product diversification and the development of “cottage”
industries, which is a way to add value to locally produced materials, have also
proven valuable to retain more income in the region where the primary production
takes place.
Governments
play an important role in creating the environment for local development.
Government intervention could be merely enabling e.g. legal frameworks for
collecting and trade, which allows others, such as NGO’s and private investors,
to develop local initiatives. Governments can also take on a lead role as major
investor. This provides an environment with longer-term security and less risk
for private investors to join and participate. Although income effects can be
generated in various ways, invariably it requires good interaction between key
stakeholders in the production column. This ensures that their activities are
well aligned so that opportunities provided by the marketplace can be exploited
to their fullest.
Any
development or introduction of promising underutilized species will have to
address sustainability issues. Especially in the context of rural development,
sustainable income effects are much more important than short-term gains that
often cause irreversible damage to traditional agricultural production systems.
Any surge in demand as a result of a successful introduction will affect the
primary production. In many cases traditional systems will not be able to cope
with the increased demand. The development of complementary production systems
is necessary. These sometimes will have to be built from scratch. The examples
of Devil’s Claw and Quinoa illustrate this point. Traditional cultivation
complemented with a more high input cultivation provides a 2-tier production
system to serve the markets. The cases reviewed also illustrate that income
generation and addressing sustainability issues can very well go hand in hand.
If these two work together and strengthen each other, a powerful model for
development is created.
Despite
the fact that income generation is an important prerequisite to develop
underutilized species, the additional income will not always translate in more
(rural) development. If additional income is spent on purely consumptive
articles (electro domestics, alcoholic beverages etc.) it will have little
positive effect on local development. In cases where the extra income is
invested in better food, education, health care and productive activities the
extra income will strengthen local development. The spending pattern depends on
which social groups control the extra income. E.g. in many cases men and women
have different spending patterns. In designing a development project for
promising species, these socio-economic factors need to be taken into
consideration since they clearly influence how income generation will affect
local development.
If
anything, the case studies reviewed indicate that “best practices” come in many
flavors. To a certain extent one could argue that this is caused by the very
diverse nature of the cases reviewed in this study. But even for a single
species such as Jatropha, we see very different
implementation scenarios (Africa vs. India). This indicates that solutions need
to be customized to a great extent to fit the specific production and market
systems that are being targeted despite the fact that there will be recurrent
issues in every assessment.
This
study suggests that best practices will at least have to
consider:
1)
links to
financial incentives
2)
strengthening
the position of primary producers
3)
product
diversification options
4)
“cottage
industry” development
5)
potential
for Government interventions
6)
potential
for NGO involvement as mediators
7)
private
sector investments
8)
longer-term
sustainability issues
9)
socio-economic
factors
Finding
the right mix of these components will determine whether the development of an
underutilized species will succeed and whether the benefits derived from this
will translate into real (rural) development.
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Grote,
K. (2003). The Increased Harvest and Trade of Devil’s Claw (Harpagophytum procumbens) and Its Impacts
on the Peoples and Environment of Namibia,
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[3] Euler, H. and D. Gorriz. (2004). Case study “Jatropha curcas”. GFU.
[4] Henning, R.K., (2003). Jatropha curcas L. in Africa. GFU.
[5]
Raimondo, D. (2002). Devil’s Claw and Cites. CITES World, issue
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[6]
Cole, D (2001). Devil’s claw in Namibia. Brochure prepared
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Devil’s
Claw Project, Namibia. CRIAA SA-DC, Windhoek,
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http://www.nutraingredients.com
[8] http://www.resourceafrica.org/programs/dc/